










































































































































Inefficiency Objection The apps/technologies encourage us to focus on 
the right things, but they aren’t very effective in 
getting us to change our behavior. 
Measurement-Management Objection The apps/technologies change our behavior, but 
this is problematic because they get us to focus on 
the wrong things. They emphasize quantity over 
quality; they are reductive. The objection comes 
in a contingent form (which calls into question the 
current measurements) and a necessary form 
(which challenges the measurement ethos more 
generally). 
Informal-Reciprocation Objection By quantifying and gamifying our relationship 
data, the apps/technologies encourage us to shift 
to formal, exchange-based models of 
relationships. Healthy relationships are not built 
on this model; they are built around informal 
reciprocation. 
Mutual Trust Objection By encouraging partners to track information 
about each other (sometimes covertly) the 
apps/technologies corrode the mutual trust that is 
needed for a well-functioning relationship. 
Instrumental vs Intrinsic Value Problem The apps/technologies encourage an instrumental 
view of the value of love. They encourage us to 
see the benefits of a well-functioning relationship 
in terms of health and well-being; not in terms of 
qualities that are intrinsic to the relationship itself. 
Gendered Relationship Objection The apps/technologies reinforce problematic 
gender roles/stereotypes within relationships, and 
may be especially harmful to women. 
Neoliberalization Objection The apps feed into the neoliberal political project. 
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They prioritize individual responsibility over 
systemic change, thereby ignoring or suppressing 
the fact that good relationships depend upon well-
functioning communities and other contextual 
supports. 
Privacy Objection The information that is tracked, logged, and 
quantified by these apps/technologies poses a 






































	 Furthermore,	even	if	the	very	idea	of	metricizing	seems	inappropriate	and	distracting	to	most	people,	it	may	not	be	inappropriate	and	distracting	to	all.	Human	sexual	proclivities	are	hugely	variable	(Gupta	2012),	and	the	need	to	respect	people’s	autonomy,	agency,	and	consent	should	be	kept	in	mind.	People	get	their	kicks,	so	to	speak,	in	different,	often	bizarre-seeming	(to	others)	ways.	Given	this	variability,	and	to	return	to	our	initial	example,	it	is	possible	that	there	are	some	people	who	genuinely	enjoy	sex	that	involves	lots	of	thrusting	and	moaning,	and	who	would	further	enjoy	tracking	their	progress	along	those	dimensions.	In	such	cases,	apps	that	measure	thrusting,	moaning,	and	other	related	variables	might	indeed	track	the	partners’	occurrent	subjective	pleasure-states	quite	well	–	and	it	could	be	beneficial	for	them	to	have	apps	like	SexKeeper	or	Spreadsheets	made	available.				 These	observations	do	not	just	apply	to	sex-tracking	apps.	They	also	apply	to	other	relationship	quantification	services.	Gift-giving	and	chore-performance,	for	example,	may	seem	irrelevant	or	misleading	for	some	couples,	but	they	may	be	valuable	and	important	to	others.	It	is	important	not	to	assume	that	all	seemingly	distracting	metrics	are	inappropriate	in	all	contexts.	It	is	also	important	not	to	assume	that	the	information	generated	by	such	metrics	could	never	be	used	in	beneficial	ways	by	the	people	who	take	them	seriously.			 This	brings	us	to	our	final,	and	perhaps	most	important,	observation.	We	think	that	the	measurement-management	problem	is	only	likely	to	be	severe	when	romantic	partners	adopt	a	thoughtless	attitude	toward	the	use	of	QR																																																																																																																																																																developers	of	QR	apps,	but	they	also	highlight	that	quantification	and	metricization	are	not	by	their	very	nature	anathema	to	well-functioning	relationships.	
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	technologies.	If	the	partners	naively	assume	that	the	app	is	a	panacea—that	giving	more	gifts	(and	the	like)	is	all	it	takes	to	improve	their	relationship—there	may	well	be	a	serious	issue.	We	should	certainly	guard	against	thoughtlessness	of	this	sort.	But	it	is	reasonable	to	think	that	this	can	be	done.	In	the	following	sections,	we	discuss	some	examples	of	how	partners	can	adopt—and	have	adopted—seemingly	extreme	tracking	and	gamification	techniques	to	apparently	good	effect.	Moreover,	app-makers	could,	themselves,	in	principle	address	this	problem	through	better	design	of	the	technology.	Indeed,	they	may	even	have	a	special	obligation	in	this	respect	to	include	reminders	and	prompts	in	their	services	that	encourage	users	not	to	take	an	overly-narrow	view	of	what	matters	in	their	relationships.			
4.3	–	Evaluating	the	Informal-Reciprocation	Objection		This	objection	takes	a	particular	stance	on	what	matters	within	a	relationship	–	informal	reciprocation	not	formal	exchange	–	and	so	it	forces	us	to	think	more	carefully	about	the	virtues	of	a	good	relationship,	and	to	confront	the	reality	of	the	‘no	one	size	fits	all’	problem.				 The	concern	here	is	both	expressive	and	psychological.	It	holds	that	people	who	track	and	gamify	what	they	and	their	intimate	partners	are	doing	will	express	the	wrong	attitude	about	their	affection/love	for	their	partners	and	will	alter	their	actual	attitudes	toward	their	partners	in	a	problematic	way.	Specifically,	they	will	signal	that	their	interactions	with	their	partners	are	akin	to	cold,	commodified	economic	exchanges,	suggesting	that	their	partners	matter		
	 33	
	only	insofar	as	they	do	something	for	them	in	return.	This	expression	will	affect	their	psychology	as	they	start	adopting	a	conditional,	potentially	resentful,	attitude	toward	their	partners:	Why	should	I	do	anything	for	you	when	you	have	done	so	little	for	me?	Consistent	with	this	view,	Clark	and	Waddell	(1985)	provided	evidence	that	exchange-based	relationships	can	foster	perceptions	of	being	exploited.			 We	think	that	the	expressive	and	attitudinal	concerns	just	outlined	are	worth	taking	seriously.	However,	there	are	additional	considerations	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account	before	one	can	assess	the	full	strength	of	this	objection.				 First,	the	expressive	meaning	of	any	behavior	or	gesture	within	a	relationship	is	highly	variable	and	contingent.	It	is	well-known	that	intimate	partners	can	construct	their	own,	private,	symbolic	languages:	gestures	or	utterances	that	mean	one	thing	to	the	world	at	large	can	mean	something	entirely	different	to	the	partners.	Further,	it	is	a	mistake	to	treat	the	meaning	that	attaches	to	a	gesture	or	behavior	as	fixed	in	any	ethical	analysis.	Symbolic	meanings	can,	do,	and	should	be	changed	if	other	ethical	considerations	override	their	value.	Brennan	and	Jaworski	(2015)	highlight	this	error	in	the	case	of	objections	to	monetary	market-based	exchanges:	money	may	signal	detachment	and	lack	of	affection	in	Western	cultures	but	it	can	signal	affection	and	attachment	in	other	cultures.	What	matters	is	whether	the	positive	consequences	of	shifting	to	a	new	symbolic	practice	outweigh	the	negative	consequences	that	attach	to	the	existing	symbolic	meaning	of	that	practice.	Take	kidney	donation	as	a	further	example.	People	might	not	like	the	expressive	
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meaning	that	attaches	to	paid	kidney	donations,	but	if	paying	for	kidney	donations	significantly	improves	outcomes	for	sufferers	of	kidney	disease,	then	perhaps	we	should	try	to	change	the	meaning	that	attaches	to	payment	rather	than	simply	treat	it	as	a	given.35	The	same	reasoning	could	be	said	to	apply	in	the	case	of	relationship	tracking	and	gamification.	Perhaps	such	behaviors	do	have	a	negative	symbolic	meaning,	on	balance,	currently,	but	if	the	practice	has	significant	beneficial	consequences,	and	if	the	negative	meaning	can	be	changed—at	least	within	the	context	of	a	particular	relationship—then	perhaps	it	should	be	changed.36			 Second,	there	are	reasons	to	think	that	informal	reciprocation	is	not	always	the	best	model	for	a	relationship,	and	could	often	be	improved	by	moving	to	more	formalized	systems	of	exchange.	Informal	reciprocation	can	benefit	the	more	powerful	partner	(often	male)	and	can	be	used	to	perpetuate	unjust	gender	inequalities	within	relationships.	Intimate	relationships	are	not	just	about	sex	and	passion;	they	are	also,	typically,	about	sharing	resources	and	time	in	the	pursuit	of	common	goals	(child-rearing;	career	aspirations;	leisure	pursuits).	The	problem	is	that	resources	are	not	always	equitably	shared	between	the	partners.	A	common	feminist	critique,	for	example,	is	that	even	though	women	are	now	‘free’	to	have	their	own	careers,	they	still	end	up	doing	most	of	the	housework	and	most	of	the	carework	(see,	e.g.,	Gordon	2014).	This	is	one	highly	problematic																																																										35	There	could	of	course	be	other	negative	consequences	associated	with	commodification,	or	other	background	ethical	issues	that	need	to	be	factored	into	the	analysis	(e.g.,	perhaps	changing	the	stigma	against	selling	kidneys	will	pressure	or	coerce	people	into	giving	up	their	kidneys;	but	see	Semrau	2015).	We	have	no	stake	in	the	kidney	donation	debate	and	the	existence	of	such	negative	consequences	doesn’t	refute	the	basic	point	we	are	trying	to	make,	namely:	if	the	beneficial	consequences	of	a	practice	are	sufficiently	great,	it	may	warrant	attempts	to	change	the	negative	meanings	that	are	presently	associated	with	it.	36	This	should	not	be	taken	to	imply	that	consequences	are	all	that	matter	in	relationships.	Other	non-consequentialist	duties	could	still	apply.	The	point	we	are	making	here	only	has	to	do	with	the	impact	of	consequences	on	how	we	should	approach	the	meaning	of	particular	behaviors	or	practices	within	a	relationship.	
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	feature	of	the	relationship	status	quo.	If	behaviors	within	a	relationship	have	not	been	tracked	and	quantified,	it	is	all	too	easy	for	this	situation	to	persist.	By	introducing	some	formal	tracking	and	quantification,	one	can	potentially	enable	greater	equity	and	accountability.			 Third,	this	isn’t	only	true	in	principle:	there	is	some	evidence	to	suggest	that	couples	can	make	formal	exchange-based	models	work	for	them.	A	fascinating	example	of	this	dynamic	is	the	relationship	between	Bethany	Soule	and	Daniel	Reeves,	co-creators	of	an	app	known	as	Beeminder.	Soule	and	Reeves	adopt	an	explicitly	formal	and	commodified	approach	to	the	sharing	of	time	and	resources	within	their	relationship.	Whenever	a	chore	needs	to	be	done,	they	submit	bids	for	the	chore	(how	much	they	would	need	to	be	paid	to	do	it)	and	whoever	submits	the	lowest	bid	gets	paid	that	amount	to	do	it.	Their	approach	has	been	profiled	(Popken	2014)	and	Soule	has	written	an	article	outlining	how	it	works	in	practice	(Soule	2013).	What	is	clear	from	these	discussions	is	that	this	formal	model	allows	for	greater	accountability	and	fairness,	at	least	for	this	couple,	as	judged	by	their	own	lights.	Neither	partner	feels	they	are	being	unfairly	treated,	so	there	is	less	simmering	resentment	building	up	in	the	background.	They	are	also	clear	that	they	don’t	quantify	and	commodify	everything	they	do.	They	allow	for	some	spontaneity	and	informality,	to	the	degree	and	in	the	manner	that	suits	their	preferences.	In	this,	they	epitomize	the	thoughtful	approach	to	the	QR	that	we	believe	justifies	a	stance	of	cautious	openness.37	
																																																								37	Some	might	say	we	are	dooming	ourselves	with	this	example.	Soule	and	Reeves	could	break	up	in	the	future.	Their	relationship	may	not	work	out.	But	we	think	this	concern	is	misplaced.	Relationships	should	not	be	measured	solely	in	terms	of	their	duration;	some	relationships	ought	
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4.4	–	Evaluating	the	Mutual	Trust	Objection	
	A	similar	analysis	applies	to	the	mutual	trust	objection.	But	what	exactly	does	mutual	trust	entail?	Although	the	concept	is	often	associated	with	sexual	fidelity,	we	take	it	to	be	a	broader	issue	than	that.	One	reason	for	this	broader	interpretation	is	that	not	every	successful	relationship	is	characterized	by	sexual	exclusivity	and	fidelity	(Rubert	&	Bogaert	2015).	So	we	assume	that,	in	a	wider	sense,	mutual	trust	involves	something	like	‘belief	that	your	partner’s	behavior	is	consistent	with	your	mutually	agreed-upon	commitments	and	considered	preferences	and	interests,	in	the	absence	of	unjustified	suspicion,	and	without	the	need	for	confirmatory	evidence’.	Understood	this	way,	mutual	trust	seems	like	a	fine	idea	–	in	theory.	Some	partnerships	and	personalities	may	be	well	disposed	toward	mutual	trust.	But	practice	is	a	different	matter.	The	relationship	status	quo	is	not	always	conducive	to	mutual	trust.	People	are	often	rightly	or	wrongly	suspicious	of	their	partners.	Relationships	can	be	beset	by	petty	jealousies	and	paranoia.	Even	if	mutual	trust	is	an	ideal,	it	is	an	ideal	that	many	fall	short	of	in	reality.			 In	some	cases,	intimate	surveillance	could	help	to	address	part	of	this	problem.	Partners	could,	for	example,	in	a	gesture	of	good	faith	and	commitment,	voluntarily	open	themselves	up	to	certain	kinds	or	degrees	of	surveillance	in	order	to	assuage	one	another’s	doubts.	This	would	have	to	be	done	carefully	and	with	due	respect	for	autonomy,	agency,	and	consent	but	note	how	transparency		
																																																																																																																																																														to	end;	and	the	fact	that	given	relationship	does	in	fact	end	(or	significantly	changes	its	form	or	character)	does	not	mean	that	the	relationship	was	a	failure.	For	our	purposes,	what	matters	is	that	this	approach	works	for	Soule	and	Reeves	in	the	here	and	now.	
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	and	accountability	of	this	sort	is	demanded	and	expected	in	many	other	contexts	(e.g.	political	and	commercial).	Allowing	similar	degrees	of	transparency	and	accountability	in	intimate	relationships	does	not	seem	to	be	so	obviously	corrosive	of	core	relationship	virtues	that	the	idea	should	not	be	entertained.			 There	are	significant	risks	that	need	to	be	factored	into	this	analysis.	Some	relationships	involve	abusive	and	domineering	personalities.	Individuals	with	such	personalities	may	force	their	partners	to	submit	to	surveillance	or	they	may	covertly	utilize	surveillance	apps	like	Flexispy.	This	cannot	be	ethically	justified.	But	even	granting	this,	there	is	a	further	question	to	consider,	which	is	whether	the	risk	of	such	abuses	is	sufficient	to	warrant	a	preemptive	ban	or	blanket	disapproval	of	intimate	surveillance.	As	two	of	us	have	noted	previously,	even	when	a	given	technology	does	have	problematic	properties	or	is	ripe	for	abuse,	there	is	a	range	of	possible	responses	–	from	total	prohibition	of	the	technology,	to	its	regulation,	to	total	freedom	in	its	development	and	retail	–	that	must	be	considered,	taking	the	balance	of	considerations	into	account	(e.g.,	Danaher,	Earp,	and	Sandberg	2017).		In	keeping	with	this	analysis,	we	suggest	that	a	three-part	stance	is	warranted.	First,	there	is	very	little	justification	for	covert	spying	apps	that	can	be	uploaded	to	a	partner’s	phone	without	their	knowledge	and	consent.	If	it	is	possible	to	ban	or	otherwise	prevent	the	development	these	apps,	this	should	be	done.	Second,	despite	this,	we	think	there	could	be	some	justification	for	surveillance	apps	that	require	consent	but	involve	a	hard-but-reversible	lock	in	(i.e.,	surveillance	apps	that	function	somewhat	like	commitment	contracts).	An		
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	example	might	be	an	app	that	allows	surveillance	for	a	period	of	time	(a	day,	a	week,	etc.)	or	that	can	only	be	reversed	by	resorting	to	a	third	party,	or	that	requires	some	penalty	to	be	paid	if	one	wishes	to	opt	out.	It	would	be	worth	exploring	whether	some	partners	could,	through	mutual	consent,	use	such	services	to	good	effect.	Third,	the	remaining	risks	of	abuse	arising	from	these	surveillance	devices	should	be	addressed	through	other	avenues,	i.e.	more	support	for	victims	of	domestic	abuse	and	violence	and	better	investigation	and	prosecution	of	such	abuses.		In	short,	one	should	be	slow	to	assume	that	all	successful	relationships	are	best	characterized	by	a	particular	notion	of	mutual	trust.	Mutual	trust	is	an	ideal	that	many	fall	short	of	in	reality.	Intimate	surveillance,	properly	agreed	to	by	partners	with	equal	bargaining	power,	could	in	some	cases	help	close	the	gap	between	principle	and	practice.		
4.5	Evaluating	the	Instrumental-Intrinsic	Value	Objection	
	This	objection	states	that	relationship-tracking	ignores	or	undermines	the	intrinsic	values	associated	with	good	relationships	by	focusing	on	quantifiable,	instrumental	benefits,	in	particular	health	benefits.			The	concern	here	seems	to	be	about	changing	attitudes	and	beliefs,	not	about	changing	loci	of	value.	Relationships	probably	are	both	intrinsically	and	instrumentally	valuable.	QR	technologies	do	not	change	this.	All	they	change	is	how	we	perceive	and	prioritize	the	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	that	attach		
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	to	relationships.	So,	instead	of	caring	about	sexual	activity	for	its	intrinsic	pleasure,	or	about	another	person	as	an	end	in	themselves,	one	starts	caring	about	them	for	reasons	associated	with	(say)	one’s	health	and	well-being.	This	is	problematic	only	insofar	as	this	shifting	focus	ends	up	missing	what	is	really	important	about	the	practice	or	attitude	in	question.			How	does	this	observation	apply	to	QR	technologies?	In	one	respect,	it	is	too	early	to	say.	We	do	not	have	sufficient	empirical	evidence	on	how	the	use	of	these	technologies	changes	peoples’	attitudes	or	behavior.	Nevertheless,	there	is	something	to	worry	about.	Many	of	the	apps	discussed	above	do	seem	to	highlight	and	emphasize	the	instrumental	benefits	of	sex	and	romance.	Why	do	you	need	to	know	about	heart	rate	and	calories	burned	during	sexual	activity?	If	the	value	of	sexual	activity	lies	primarily	in	the	occurrent	subjective	experiences	of	those	involved,	and	shared	intimacy	and	closeness	between	the	lovers,	this	information	about	physiological	measures	and	additional	health	benefits	would	seem	to	distract	from	what	is	truly	important.		There	is	an	interesting	question	to	be	asked	about	why	the	apps	and	technologies	tout	such	instrumental	health-related	benefits.	It	could	be	that	they	are	simply	tapping	into	(and	perhaps	reinforcing)	a	general	cultural	obsession	with	personal	health	and	fitness.	It	may	be	that	doing	so	makes	the	apps	more	attractive	and	more	likely	to	get	attention	in	a	highly	competitive	market	(the	health	and	fitness	sections	of	the	iOS	and	Android	app	stores	are	among	the	most	popular).	Insofar	as	this	focus	on	health	benefits	is	indeed	problematic,	it	is	something	that	probably	should	be	downplayed.	The	metrics	and	gamification		
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	tactics	employed	by	the	apps	could,	and	probably	should,	focus	more	on	the	intrinsic	values	associated	with	relationships.	Again,	Nipple’s	subjective	rating	system	would	seem	to	point	the	way	toward	alternative	metrics	that	get	us	closer	to	what	is	widely	held	to	matter.		All	of	that	said,	it	is	important	to	emphasize	that	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	can	live	side	by	side	in	intimate	relationships.	It	would	be	foolish	to	adopt	a	staunchly	intrinsic	approach	to	the	value	of	a	relationship	that	refuses	to	recognize	any	additional	extrinsic	benefits.	It	is	already	well-established	that	intimate	or	romantic	relationships	have	many	instrumental	benefits,	ranging	from	the	financial	benefits	that	are	often	associated	with	being	in	certain	legally	recognized	forms	of	relationship,	to	clear	advantages	to	physical	health,	longevity,	and	well-being	when	the	relationship	is	functioning	well	(Wudarczyk	et	al.	2013).	We	should	not	assume	that	there	is	a	mutually	exclusive	choice	here.	It	is	quite	possible	to	have	a	complex	and	multi-faceted	attitude	toward	our	intimate	relationships,	whereby	we	value	them	both	intrinsically	and	instrumentally	(see	Earp	et	al.	2016).	Moreover,	if	monitoring	the	instrumental	benefits	starts	to	interfere	with	maintaining	the	aspects	of	these	relationships	that	we	value	intrinsically,	we	could	take	notice	of	this,	and	change	the	ways	in	which	we	relate	to	the	extrinsic	effects	of	our	relationships.		A	related	worry	is	that	gamification	of	relationships	could	encourage	a	mind-set	whereby	people	start	caring	about	‘winning’	the	relationship	‘game’	rather	than	about	the	goods	specifically	related	to	their	actual	relationship.38		
																																																								38	We	thank	one	of	our	anonymous	reviewers	for	raising	this	concern.	
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	Thus,	the	apps	do	not	simply	change	how	we	perceive	the	balance	of	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	that	attach	to	our	relationships;	they	create	a	new	locus	of	value	(the	relationship	game)	that	dominates	our	attention.	This	worry	certainly	merits	consideration.	However,	pending	further	research,	we	think	that	it	is	fair	to	assume	that	a	majority	of	users	of	QR	technologies	would	not	so	easily	enter	into	such	a	mind-set	(i.e.,	a	mindset	according	to	which	winning	an	app-based	game	would	become	the	only,	or	even	primary,	end	they	would	have	with	respect	to	their	relationship).	In	other	words,	it	is	hard	to	believe	that	the	game(s)	could	be	so	absorbing,	and	that	people’s	concern	for	their	relationships	would	be	so	tenuous,	that	this	shift	in	ultimate	ends	would	happen	on	a	large	scale.	That	said,	we	welcome	and	encourage	empirical	research	into	the	issue.		
4.6	–	Evaluating	the	Gendered	Relationship	Objection		What	of	the	claim	that	QR	technologies	are	likely	to	reinforce	problematic	gender	stereotypes	and	relationship	roles?	This	is	almost	certainly	going	to	happen.	Harmful	gender	stereotypes	and	invidious	biases	are	rife	in	society	at	large	and	it	is	not	surprising,	though	it	is	no	less	regrettable,	that	this	gets	reflected	in	our	technologies.	We	agree	that	this	is	a	serious	concern.	But	here,	too,	there	are	additional	considerations	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account	before	the	full	strength	of	the	objection	can	be	assessed,	and	before	the	proper	response	to	it	can	be	articulated.			First,	as	mentioned	above,	there	are	ways	in	which	tracking	and	quantification	could	help	reverse	or	reduce	gender-based	problems	within	some		
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	relationships.	Our	earlier	argument	about	the	benefits	of	formal	exchange	for	some	partners	over	informal	reciprocation	provides	one	example	of	this;	our	upcoming	argument	about	community-based	initiatives	using	intimate	tracking	(see	below)	provides	another.			Second,	context	matters,	almost	always	more	than	sheer	content,	when	it	comes	to	the	gender-related	impact	of	any	given	app	or	service	of	this	sort.	This	is	something	that	has	been	widely	discussed	in	relation	to	pornographic	representations	and	their	impact	on	women	(Drabek	2016).	In	that	debate,	it	is	often	argued	that	some	pornographic	material	contains	content	that	is	prima	
facie	inegalitarian	or	degrading	(e.g.,	BDSM	pornography)	but	that	is	often	used	and	expressed	in	a	context	that	mitigates	or	undermines	any	inegalitarian	effects	it	may	have.	Thus	context	moderates	the	meaning	and	significance	of	the	content.	The	same	is	likely	to	be	true	in	the	case	of	apps	and	services	that	feature	content	that	is	similarly	prima	facie	objectionable:	whether	it	is	actually	objectionable,	or	likely	to	have	objectionable	effects,	will	depend	more	on	the	general	social	context	in	which	the	apps	are	developed,	as	well	as	on	the	particulars	of	the	relationships	in	which	they	are	used.		The	gender-based	objection	does,	we	believe,	warrant	a	stance	of	constant	vigilance	towards	apps	and	services	of	this	sort.	It	is	right	and	proper	for	people	to	call	out	app-makers	for	the	problematic	and	gendered	assumptions	that	underlie	the	services	they	provide.	This	will	help	to	improve	the	social	context	in	which	apps	of	this	sort	are	used	and	reproduced.	A	clear	example	of	this	happening	has	already	been	provided	in	the	case	of	the	period-tracking	apps		
	 43	
	that	are	targeted	at	heterosexual	men	and	that	perpetuate	myths	about	the	female	menstrual	cycle.	These	apps	have	been	ridiculed	and	critiqued	in	public	and	often	quickly	removed	from	the	leading	app	stores.		
4.7	Evaluating	the	Neoliberalization	Objection	
	This	brings	us	to	the	last	of	the	objections	(recall	that	we	are	setting	aside	the	ones	about	privacy).	This	objection	calls	attention	to	the	tendency	of	tracking	technologies	to	privatize,	and	make	individuals	responsible	for,	what	are	at	base	more	structural	social	problems.			What	might	this	mean	in	the	context	of	a	relationship?	We	recognize	two	interpretations:	either	it	means	that	relationships	are	best	when	they	come	with	the	right	social	supports	(tax	benefits,	childcare	allowances,	good	community	services	and	amenities,	support	from	family	and	friends)	and	the	QR	technologies	tend	to	shift	the	burden	of	responsibility	onto	the	relationship	partners	and	away	from	the	providers	of	these	social	supports;	or	it	means	that	QR	technologies	tend	to	re-privatize	aspects	of	intimate	relationships	that	some	have	sought	to	make	more	public,	such	as	problems	around	intimate	abuse	and	violence.	How	plausible	are	these	concerns	in	the	context	of	the	present	discussion?		In	general,	how	plausible	they	are	will	depend	on	how	much	one	buys	into	the	broader	neoliberal	critique	and	its	application	to	relationships.	We	tend	to	think	that	many	of	the	behaviors	addressed	by	QR	technologies	can	plausibly		
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	be	construed	as	having	a	solution	primarily	at	the	individual	level	(e.g.,	being	more	caring	toward	one’s	partner).	Furthermore,	the	neoliberal	critique	often	assumes	a	false	dichotomy.	As	others	have	recently	argued	(Madva	2016),	it	is	too	simple	to	think	in	terms	of	prioritizing	the	systemic	over	the	individual	or	vice	versa:	instead,	individual	changes	are	often	essential	to	successful	systemic	reform.	As	Kristina	Gupta	has	stated:			Interventions	aimed	at	the	individual	may	be	effective	and	may	have	reverberating	effects	on	the	broader	social	issues,	and	vice	versa.	[.	.	.]	Combined	with	efforts	to	address	the	social	factors	that	contribute	to	[problematic	relationships	or	forms	or	states	of	love]	and	with	measures	in	place	to	mitigate	the	normalizing	potential	of	these	interventions,	[relationship]	technologies	may	indeed	increase	human	flourishing.		(2013,	19)		 More	importantly,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	neoliberal	critique	misses	what	is	most	interesting	and	potentially	disruptive,	in	the	best	sense,	about	QR	technologies.	Apps	and	devices	aimed	at	improving	intimate	relationships	through	collective	tracking,	surveillance	and	gamification,	actually	highlight	the	social,	community-oriented	potential	of	these	technologies.	They	show	how	this	technology	can	be	used	to	collect	information	that	would	otherwise	be	hidden,	and	to	share	that	information	between	two	or	more	people.	This	can,	of	course,	impact	individual	behavior;	but	it	can	also	impact	collective,	social	behavior.	It	is	consequently	a	mistake	to	assume	that	QR	technologies	necessarily	have	a	private	orientation.	If	one’s	concern	is	the	lack	of	systemic	supports	for		
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	relationship	partners,	or	the	re-privatization	of	public	problems,	then	tracking	and	surveillance	could	be	used	to	promote	systemic	solutions.			For	example,	it	could	document	the	struggle	that	relationship	partners	have	in	the	absence	of	social	and	community	support.	It	could	shine	light	on	often	hidden	problems	of	domestic	abuse	and	violence.	Such	community-oriented	projects	are	already	being	undertaken	concerning	other	issues,	using	self-tracking	and	surveillance	technologies.	For	instance,	there	are	noteworthy	social	movements	that	use	such	technologies	to	contribute	to	community	knowledge	(the	citizen	science	movement)	and	to	community-based	activism	(the	citizen-sensing	movement)	(Lupton	2016).	Some	of	the	most	prominent	examples	of	activism	in	this	vein	focus	on	recording	environmental	pollution	and	facilitating	responses	to	the	associated	harms.39	Perhaps	a	similar	approach,	broadly	construed,	could	be	taken	with	respect	to	relationships	using	QR	technologies.		Of	course,	we	have	to	be	realistic.	Many	of	the	apps	and	technologies	described	earlier	are	made	for	commercial	purposes.	They	only	survive	and	thrive	if	they	become	commercially	viable.	This	is	a	consequence	of	how	these	services	get	funded	and	created	in	the	present	era.	As	long	as	this	funding	process	continues,	it	is	likely	that	they	will	prop	up	and	reinforce	the	dominant	economic	and	other	ideologies	of	our	time.	But	we	think	this	should	be	seen	as	an	opportunity	rather	than	a	fatal	problem.	It	highlights	the	great	potential	for	Open	Source,	social,	or	academically	funded	QR	technologies.	These	approaches																																																										39	See,	for	example,	https://citizensense.net	
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	could	redirect	these	technologies	away	from	private,	commercial	uses	to	more	positive	social	uses.		
5.	Conclusion	and	Next	Steps	Where	do	we	go	from	here?	Our	own	view	is	that	the	Quantified	Relationship	is	a	fascinating	emerging	phenomenon	worthy	of	closer	scrutiny.	To	date,	the	literature	has	done	a	good	job	at	identifying	some	of	the	main	concerns	one	could	have	about	this	phenomenon.	But	this	is	not	enough.	We	need	to	move	beyond	cataloguing	concerns	to	the	careful	assessment	of	their	merits.	How	seriously	should	we	take	them?	When	might	it	be	a	good	idea	to	use	QR	technologies,	and	when	might	it	be	a	bad	idea?	We	have	tried	to	take	the	first	step	in	this	direction	with	our	evaluation	of	the	objections	raised	thus	far.			 Our	position	is	that	there	is	no	blanket	objection	to,	nor	knockdown	argument	against,	the	use	of	QR	technologies.	Instead,	the	objections	that	have	been	raised	can	be	seen	as	identifying	a	set	of	guidelines	to	follow	or	cautions	to	mindful	of	when	using	such	technologies	in	intimate	relationships.	The	lessons	learned	from	these	objections	can	help	us	to	stay	on	the	right	ethical	track,	and	may	generate	useful	fodder	for	policy	discussions	concerning	possible	prohibition	or	regulation	(where	necessary),	as	well	as	for	wider	conversations	in	society	about	what	makes	a	for	a	good	relationship,	and	how	to	achieve	that	(see	Earp	&	Savulescu	in	press).		There	are	gaps	in	what	we	have	argued:	our	discussion,	despite	its	length,	has	in	no	way	been	comprehensive.	This	shows	how	complex	the	matters	we		
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	have	explored	truly	are.	We	have	simply	sought	to	push	back	against	the	prevailing	skeptical	evaluations	of	QR	technologies	that	have	so	far	been	raised	in	the	literature,	toward	a	more	fruitful	dialectic.	We	welcome	the	efforts	of	others	to	respond	in	kind,	and	to	highlight	any	weaknesses	they	see	in	our	appraisals	or	additional	objections	that	we	may	have	missed.	We	also	call	for	greater	empirical	investigation	of	the	effects	of	these	technologies	on	our	attitudes	to	others	and	on	the	utility	of	these	technologies	in	changing	behavior.	In	this	respect,	we	think	there	are	great	opportunities	in	the	development	of	QR	technologies	that	have	yet	to	be	fully	exploited.			
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